however, circumstances in the case which seemed to show that he had had a quarrel with the man whom he put to death. He was accordingly convicted and executed. If he had killed some one whom he had never seen before, and entirely without apparent motive, those circumstances, coupled with the strangeness of his conduct and the delusion of which he was the victim, would in all probability have procured his acquittal. " I could hardly find an instance which illustrates more clearly the position for which I am contending; namely, that however the burden of proof may in the course of the investigation be shifted from one side to the other, the question to be ultimately solved is and ought to be, was the prisoner able to know that the act he was doing was wrong ? The various misunderstandings which have taken place upon this subject mostly arise from confounding together the thing to be proved, and the means of proving it.
" No doubt proof of insanity generally, or of insane delusion specially, is strong presumptive evidence of the prisoner's irresponsibility; but it is evidence merely, and evidence of the effect of which the jury is the proper judge, and whatever faults may be found with juries, no one will charge them with giving too little weight to such evidence. " I doubt whether it is possible to put a case of a person who wilfully and maliciously commits a crime whom the public would not wish to punish, if all the circumstances of the case were before them. I doubt whether any course of proceeding could make a nearer approach than is made by the present rules of law to the provision of means for the punishment of all such persons, and the exemption of all others.
"It is now an admitted principle of jurisprudence that the object of punishment is the prevention of crime, and that except in so far as it has that tendency it is an evil. The rules of law with respect to the punishment of madmen are in entire agreement with this principle, for it is notorious that mad people in general are as much acted upon by fear as those who are sane, as to those acts which are in any way under their own control. The cunning with which they will often conceal their insanity when examined on commissions of lunacy proves this conclusively.* The law as it now stands recognises in their case the distinction that it would be useless to punish them for acts of which they cannot appreciate the criminality, because for such acts they would not anticipate punishment. A man, for example, might abstain from murder because he might suppose that he would be hanged for it ; but that would not induce him to abstain from breaking crockery, yet he might be under a delu- 
